Equities

China’s remarkable policy shift is just one part of the bigger picture

Asphalt highway and city skyline in Shanghai
Key takeaways
Economic struggles
1

China’s economic struggles, in part, stem from large and prolonged property price declines and a collapse in transactional liquidity.

A policy shift
2

A raft of easing measures has been rolled out by various Chinese government agencies, but many details have not been disclosed.

The bigger picture
3

If China can accomplish its policy goals, the results could be very positive for the economy. But this is not why we own our companies.

China stocks, which represent 28% of the MSCI Emerging Markets Index (and 21% of the Invesco Developing Markets Fund)1, have returned from an extended period of dormancy to the center of attention for investors in developing markets. After three rather miserable years (-16% annualized returns June 2021-June 2024), the MSCI China Index surged 22% in the last week of September2 after policymakers stepped in with renewed vigor to address some of the causes of China’s economic struggles.

Below we discuss why China’s nominal economic growth has decelerated spectacularly over the past three years, how these remarkable policy announcements are intended to help, and why our bullish stance on our China holdings transcends these announcements.

A dramatic deceleration in property has been central to China’s economic struggles

In 2020, China announced its “three red lines” policy, which set limits on financial leverage and effectively bankrupted most private sector property developers. The property sector, which accounted for more than a quarter of gross domestic product (GDP) in the decade between 2011 and 20213, went into a free fall. Property starts are down 65% since peak levels in 2021, while property sales are down 50%.4

China, with 50% to 60% of household wealth concentrated in property for the past 20 years5, was particularly susceptible to large and prolonged property price declines and a collapse in transactional liquidity. The wealth shock and parallel stress related to employment and incomes have, unsurprisingly, led households to increase financial savings, resulting in a radical domestic consumption slowdown. This, in turn, led to a huge increase in cash and bank deposits, which are well north of $20 trillion — almost 110% of GDP.6 

Growth has also been hit by local government fiscal stress, with revenues highly levered to land sales. Following 15 years of boom-bust local government stimulus and debt expansion, local government spending has been in retreat.

Recent policy decisions were well timed, but lack details

The diagnosis of the problem and the prescription for stimulating growth through consumption seems to be accurate. The goal is a Keynesian push, albeit belated, to stop deflation. Policymakers have clearly articulated aspirations to underwrite and stabilize the property sector and to unclog the interconnected nexus of local government fiscal and property market stresses (including dealing with off-balance-sheet local government debt), perhaps Hamilton style.

A raft of easing measures has been rolled out by various government agencies, including monetary measures (policy rate cut, lower reserve requirements) and credit policies (proactive reduction in outstanding mortgage rates and easing of restrictions on home purchases/mortgages). There also appears to be the realization that supportive capital market policies may be part of the solution to repairing household balance sheets and addressing the long-term issue of excess savings in China. 

These announcements appear to be well-timed, as recent USD policy rate cuts are supportive of the Renminbi (RMB). However, the details, including the magnitude and focus of fiscal stimulus, have not been disclosed and await legislative approvals, likely in the next few weeks. Market volatility of recent days reflects uncertainty about these details, which clearly matter.

What could make China great again?

  • Unleash domestic consumption by addressing economic insecurity and inequality. China’s core problem is a savings problem. Households which take in approximately 53% of GDP (low by most standards), save nearly one-third of disposable incomes7. While inequality has an influence here, inadequate pensions and health care coverage have added to the burden of China’s longstanding previous one-child policy. We believe more thoughtful social support for China’s population could address both the excess savings problem and reignite massive domestic demand growth potential.
  • Unleash the potential of its underdeveloped service sector by addressing the insecurities of entrepreneurs and the private sector. There is massive productivity gain potential in China’s very fragmented service industry that can only be driven by the private sector. And, at this stage of China’s development, service industries, not manufacturing or technology, are going to drive employment growth, in our view. The knock-on effect would be a reduction in China’s vulnerability to geopolitical strains at a time when much of the rest of the world is increasingly resistant to China’s growing current account surpluses.
  • Then of course there is liberalizing the capital markets, which would improve capital efficiency in the economy. But that is another story.

We are cautiously optimistic, but this is not why we own our companies 

While we disclaim any particular insight into China policymaking at this stage, our hunch is that this is truly a remarkable shift in policy direction. Like the sudden reversal around COVID restrictions, this is another 180-degree shift. We suspect that policymakers will deliver the sustained fiscal expansion necessary to accomplish their well-articulated goals.

Although markets are focused on the magnitude of fiscal stimulus, we would like to see efforts to both reduce cyclical stress and provide greater institutional capacity for structural growth. China needs to change the tired economic model of the past in order to reap the enormous potential growth it has as a continental-sized, developing economy. If they manage to accomplish this, the results could be very positive for the economy, but this is not why we own our companies.

What we own in China — and why

Despite our underweight in China, we are very bullish on the Invesco Developing Markets Fund’s China holdings. We have structurally attractive companies with durable growth, sustainable advantage, and significantly improved returns to shareholders, and we believe valuations remain attractive (even after significant recent gains). Our investments in H World, Tencent, Meituan, and AIA8 are in companies with attractive structural growth, in markets where competitive discipline has improved materially, and where boards are returning historically high levels of cash to shareholders through large buybacks and rising dividends. We have also in recent months expanded our core investments in China to Alibaba9, a company that is in the process of a historic improvement in capital allocation and is returning its massive cash pile to shareholders at record levels.

Footnotes

  • 1

    Source: FactSet: As of 9/30/2024

  • 2

    Source: Bloomberg: As of 9/30/2024

  • 3

    Source: National Bureau of Statistics (NBS): 2023 Annual Report

  • 4

    Source: (NBS): July 2024 (Starts measured by volumes and sales measured by sqm volumes)

  • 5

    Source: People’s Bank of China (PBoC) Survey: 2019-2023

  • 6

    Source: (PBoC): September 2024

  • 7

    Source: (NBS): 2023 Annual Report

  • 8

    Source: As of 9/30/2024, the Invesco Developing Markets Fund held 5.8%, 5.1%, 3.1%, 2.7% and 1.2% in Tencent, H World, Meituan, Alibaba and AIA, respectively. Holdings are subject to change and are not buy/sell recommendations.