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Fixed Income
The end of rate hikes: Are we there yet?
As the market patiently waits for central banks to wind down rate hiking, we wonder, is the journey really this long, or have we gotten lost along the way?
One weak data point after another has caused investors to question whether the Chinese government’s 5% economic growth target is in danger.
Invesco Fixed Income believes 5% growth is still within reach, but the economy’s direction will likely depend on policies.
Several policy measures, including the recent reduction in mortgage rates for outstanding mortgages and the easing of home purchase restrictions should help put a floor under sentiment.
After abruptly ending its zero-COVID policy, China bounced back strongly in the first quarter. Economic forecasters promptly upgraded their growth projections beyond the government’s moderate 5% target. Now, that positive sentiment has been replaced with doom and gloom. One weak data point after another has highlighted slowing domestic demand, a weakening currency, deflation, and portfolio outflows. Reports of companies falling behind on debt payments have also weighed on sentiment. Add to this the weak policy response so far to stabilize the economy, and investors are questioning whether the government’s growth target is in danger, and what would a sharp slowdown in China mean for the global economy and markets?
Invesco Fixed Income believes the answer lies somewhere between optimism and doom and gloom. We believe China is at a crossroads – the economy’s direction will likely depend on policies. We think 5% growth is still within reach, and doom and gloom can be avoided. In our view, a revival in sequential growth is possible by the fourth quarter, but it would likely require a rapid deployment of the recently announced reflationary policies. Should they fail to turn around sentiment and economic data, there will likely be a need for more supportive polices. Otherwise, we may enter an alternative universe not seen in China’s recent history, with a downshift in economic activity potentially to the mid-3% to 4% range, further adjustments in asset prices, and more concerns about balance sheets.
The fact that growth fizzled after the first quarter reflects the multi-faceted challenges China faces, many of which have their roots in the property sector. Official efforts begun in 2020 to reduce excesses in the property sector precipitated a vicious cycle, as leveraged property developers experienced financing problems and many committed, and mostly prepaid, housing projects stalled. Household confidence in housing investment sank, exacerbated by the COVID reopening when employment and income outlooks were uncertain. Widespread house price declines ensued, especially in lower-tier cities, where excess supply had been a concern well before COVID.
In addition, the authorities’ crackdown on large platform industries, starting with Alibaba in 2020 and moving to the education sector, undermined confidence and dampened private capital investment and the employment outlook. This came on top of COVID-related scars in the service sector, the largest source of employment. Despite efforts to push credit to the real economy, private investment has not bounced back sufficiently. Weaker global demand for goods hasn’t helped investment in trade-dependent manufacturing, and destocking is still the theme of the day, rather than rebuilding inventory or capacity.
The authorities’ time-tested approach of using infrastructure and local government investment as a countercyclical fiscal policy tool to increase fixed capital investment is also reaching its limits. Land sales represent an estimated 30% of local government revenues.1 A stalled housing sector means stretched local government budgets when it comes to infrastructure spending, especially after the expensive enforcement of the zero-COVID policy and related health expenditures. If anything, total fiscal outlays shrank in the first half of this year, detracting from growth momentum.
Amid a deteriorating employment and income outlook, households have pulled back from the housing market and housing-related consumption, such as appliances and furnishings, which are estimated to be about 8% to 10% of total consumption.2 Other big-ticket purchases, such as automobiles and communication equipment, are also slowing. As a result, retail consumption growth remains below 2019 levels.
Since second-quarter gross domestic product (GDP) growth was reported, each new data point on real economic activity has surprised to the downside, spurring a policy response from the authorities in July on the heels of the Politburo meeting. These measures were focused on household consumption along with housing and private business sentiment, but policymakers refrained from deploying the type of large-scale stimulus that was launched after the global financial crisis.3 In our view, this reflects a recognition of the structural issues facing China’s economy, which can no longer be addressed by creating excessive leverage in the system.
Until recently, the policy measures were deemed too modest and too late to stabilize market sentiment, especially in the housing sector. However, in early September, the government response shifted from more targeted sector-specific policies to national monetary policy, with cuts to various policy tools, including the loan prime rate, as well as a nationwide reduction in mortgage rates for outstanding loans and the pulling back on several other housing related restrictions.
Source: Tianlei Huang, Working Papers 23-5, June 2023, “Why China’s housing policies have failed.” Data as of Dec. 31, 2017.
Source: Macrobond. Data as of Dec. 31, 2019.
The measures focused on household consumption promoted big-ticket, service, rural, digital and green spending. In the housing sector, several local authorities relaxed house purchase restrictions, including lowering loan-to-value ratios and new mortgage rates. Measures to promote private business sentiment focused on five major areas: fair treatment in market access and government procurement, cost reductions for business operations, transparent legal protections, improved regulatory and financial services for private businesses and the restriction of online criticism of private entrepreneurs. The new guidelines also encourage private participation in certain high-tech areas and grant eligible companies the ability to compensate employees according to their expertise level, a privilege previously reserved for state-owned enterprises.
Source: Government announcements. July-August 2023.
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The risks of investing in securities of foreign issuers, including emerging market issuers, can include fluctuations in foreign currencies, political and economic instability, and foreign taxation issues.
Investments in companies located or operating in Greater China are subject to the following risks: nationalization, expropriation, or confiscation of property, difficulty in obtaining and/or enforcing judgments, alteration or discontinuation of economic reforms, military conflicts, and China’s dependency on the economies of other Asian countries, many of which are developing countries.
Gross domestic product is a broad indicator of a region’s economic activity, measuring the monetary value of all the finished goods and services produced in that region over a specified period of time.
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