



Tracking Pandemic: COVID-19

Assessing the spread of the disease and responses to it

Monthly Market Focus from the Global Market Strategy Office

Kristina Hooper

Chief Global Market Strategist

Ashley Oerth

Investment Strategy Analyst

April 2020



This document is for Qualified Investors in Switzerland; Professional Clients only in Dubai, Jersey, Guernsey, Ireland, the Isle of Man, Continental Europe (as defined in the important information) and the UK; for Institutional Investors only in the United States and Australia; in New Zealand for wholesale investors (as defined in the Financial Markets Conduct Act); for Professional Investors in Hong Kong; for Qualified Institutional Investors in Japan; in Canada, this document is restricted to Accredited Investors as defined under National Instrument 45-106. It is not intended for and should not be distributed to, or relied upon by, the public or retail investors. Please do not redistribute this document.

Letter to Investors



The coronavirus, in a matter of weeks, has plagued the global economy and brought unprecedented shutdowns of economic activity across the world. Travel is restricted, commerce is severely depressed, and millions have lost their jobs. Here, we provide an overview of the market and macro environments, and the policy responses to date.

We are watchful of new infection rates as an indicator of the extent of lockdown orders issued by governments. Confirmed infections have exploded globally, breaking 10,000 on February 1, 100,000 on March 6, and 1 million on April 2. Today, as of April 16, 2,152,646 confirmed cases have been reported worldwide. With each passing week, it seems additional measures have been enacted and existing ones extended. Until we see a meaningful and prolonged flattening of new infections, we expect governments across the world to continue these radical actions. We look to the University of Oxford's Stringency Index as a key measure of the extent of government lockdown orders.

The evolution of lockdowns has spelled trouble for the macro environment, evolving first from a story of depressed consumption to today where we observe widespread economic distress resulting from extensive and widespread lockdowns. Our base case in the US relies on the assumption of economic lockdowns lasting no longer than three months. In this scenario, we expect a recovery to take place beginning after the lifting of lockdown orders, first registering a recession followed by a budding recovery to make for a U-shaped path for growth. This recovery is dependent on the health of the consumer coming out of this crisis, specifically the duration and permanence of layoffs and any debt build-up on household balance sheets, and the ability of companies to remain solvent for the duration of the crisis.

After a historically sharp drop in March, markets have recovered substantially, though most broad stock market indices remain down more than 10% year-to-date as of this writing. With widespread economic lockdowns, our attention has been focused on the

health of credit markets. We look to option-adjusted spreads as a signal of credit distress, which have cooled in recent trading following the passage of the US CARES Act. In equities, we expect forward-looking returns to be depressed by reduced or suspended dividends and a steep drop in stock buybacks. The return to risk assets has been substantial, but we suspect heightened volatility to persist until the pandemic risk abates.

Encouragingly, governments across the globe have put forward radical and substantial stimulus and support programs. In the US specifically, a host of Federal Reserve specialized facilities combined with the \$2.2 trillion CARES Act Policy have signaled deep policy backing to get the American economy through the worst of the COVID-19 crisis.

Our view is that this crisis will deeply impact the global economy, but the worst of equity performance may be behind us. We are not out of the woods yet, and even after this crisis is behind us the effects will be felt for years to come. A potential build-up in sovereign and private debts also looms.

Our Assessment

1. Countries have ratcheted up their lockdowns as new infections exploded in each country. We expect that a significant and sustained downtrend in infections will spell the beginning of the end to economic lockdowns.
2. Our base case is for a U-shaped recovery following the end of economic shutdowns, though this presumes shutdowns last no longer than about three months.
3. Markets have suffered meaningfully, and we are watchful of renewed pressures on global markets, especially in debt.
4. Widespread and substantial fiscal and monetary policy across the globe have stabilized global economies, but we suspect more stimulus may be necessary, especially if lockdowns persist.

Source: Invesco, as of 4/16/2020. Infection numbers are from Johns Hopkins Center for Health Security.

Agenda



1 Tracking the pace and control of the COVID-19 pandemic

2 Macro scenarios and indicators

3 Market response & implications


4 Assessing monetary, fiscal policy

Comparison of Coronavirus with Other Infectious Diseases



Fatality vs. Infection Rates

Fatality rate (log scale)




Source: Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society, World Health Organization, New York Times, Estimate based on preliminary figures as of 2/29/2020.

Tracking Pandemic: The Affliction of COVID-19 Across the Globe


Observing curve-flattening on a relative scale



Cases, Countries with Greater Than 100 Cases



Deaths, Countries with Greater Than 10 Deaths



Source: Invesco, Johns Hopkins, 4/16/2020. Vertical scale in both charts is logarithmic with a factor base of 10.

Epidemiology Drives Public Health Policy to “Flatten the Curve”: Social Distancing, Self-Isolation, Contact Tracing/Sequestration




Stylised caseload profile

New cases

“Squashing the sombrero”

Boris Johnson PM











Sources: United Kingdom Department of Health, Invesco. For illustrative purposes only.

Lessons in Curve-Flattening

Until New Infections Fall, We Expect Lockdowns to Continue









Daily New Infections in Selected Countries, Days Since 100 Infections



Source: Bloomberg, 4/16/2020.

Proactive Lockdown Stringency Has Flattened Curves in Asia

EU Curves are flattening now; UK, US Curves have yet to flatten...



— Infections (Left Axis) ● Stringency Index (Right Axis)


The Stringency Index tracks policies such as school closures and travel bans. Left-hand vertical scale in all charts is logarithmic with a factor base of 10.
 Source: University of Oxford, Blavatnik School of Government, Oxford COVID-19 Government Response Tracker, 4/16/2020.

Scenario Uncertainty: What If... There's a Second Wave?

W-Shaped Double Dip Conceivable but Should Be Less Severe



UK Scenarios: Critical Care Beds Occupied, per 100k of population



- Private Spending unlikely to experience another, such severe shock – basic needs must be met
- Depression threat? We think it very unlikely:
 - NBER – 33 US recessions since 1854; 47 since 1790; 6 depressions, *all* without active fiscal or Fed policy
- Pandemics past suggest we can and will overcome

Note: NBER US business cycle/recession dating has been back-built to 1854; NBER and academic economists have made estimates going back to the establishment of the US federation and Treasury in 1790. Source: Imperial College COVID-19 Response Team paper commissioned for HM Government and the White House Coronavirus Task Force, 16 March 2020; Invesco

Agenda



1 Tracking the pace and control of the COVID-19 pandemic

2 Macro scenarios and indicators

3 Market response & implications

4 Assessing monetary, fiscal policy


Macro Scenarios for the US Economy



Probability: Low	Probability: Medium	Probability: Low
Worst Case Scenario	Base Case Scenario	Best Case Scenario
COVID-19 is widespread and difficult to contain Lockdowns last 4 or more months Prolonged economic slump lasting throughout the year L-shaped recovery Severe Recession	COVID-19 is widespread, containment slow but effective Lockdowns last 3 or fewer months Sharp dip in economic activity Between U- and V-shaped recovery Recession	COVID-19 is widespread and containment measures effective Lockdowns last 2 months Short sharp dip in economic activity V-shaped recovery Short & Sharp Recession

Source: Invesco Scenario Analysis, 4/13/2020. Chart is shown for illustrative purposes only and is not intended as investment advice.

V-, U-, W-, L- or Square-Root-Shaped Recovery? Depends on Extent of Lockdowns and Maintaining Financial Stability



- Most modern, developed market recessions have been “garden-variety”
- Financial boom/bust cycles were much more common in the past and in emerging markets
- Depressions (multi-year recessions with repeated year-on-year declines have happened in the US
- Active Fed and Fiscal policy very likely to mean that we avoid depression

Notes: *Classical “V-Shape” recession and recovery – the median of 410 short recessions over the last 200 years – GDP contracted in the prior calendar year (t-1 to t) before recovering to or above trend growth rate in the following year. **Median across developed market economies which experienced systemic banking crises from 2007-08.


Source: Oxford Economics, Haver Analytics, Maddison Project Database; Invesco. Data through calendar 2018.

The Rise of Economic Shutdowns

While China reopens, much of the rest of the world is shuttered



Potential Geographic Impact of Lockdowns on Global GDP



- Abrupt shifts in national, global economic activity
- Households shift to basic needs
- SMEs and large firms cut spending – purchasing, investment and staff
- Sudden shift in activity prompts cash hoarding


Source: IMF, Oxford Economics, Haver Analytics, Invesco. Data for Calendar 2018.

Recession in Fast-Forward

Fall in services PMIs accelerates during the course of Q1 2020



Q1 Fall in Flash Services PMIs



Recessionary Collapses in PMIs



		Composite	Manufacturing	Services
US	Feb	49.6	50.7	49.4
	Mar	40.9	48.5	39.8
	Change	-8.7	-2.2	-9.6
France	Feb	52.0	49.8	52.5
	Mar	28.9	43.2	27.4
	Change	-23.1	-6.6	-25.1
Germany	Feb	50.7	48.0	52.5
	Mar	35.0	45.4	31.7
	Change	-15.7	-2.6	-20.8
Eurozone	Feb	51.6	49.2	52.6
	Mar	29.7	44.5	26.4
	Change	-21.9	-4.7	-26.2
UK	Feb	53.0	51.7	53.2
	Mar	36.0	47.8	34.5
	Change	-17.0	-3.9	-18.7
Japan	Feb	47.0	47.8	46.8
	Mar	36.2	44.8	33.8
	Change	-10.8	-3.0	-13.0

- Manufacturing, Trade and Investment had suffered from the trade war but had been recovering
- Consumption and Services now taking a COVID-19 hit
- Fall in Services PMIs has accelerated sharply in Q1
- A recession's worth of private spending contraction in one quarter...

Sources: IHS Markit, Bloomberg, and Invesco, 4/3/2020.

Historic Pace of US Layoffs Is Sure to Be Seen Elsewhere



Policy support necessary to keep households, businesses solvent



Sources: US Bureau of Labor Statistics Occupational Employment Statistics (2018) and Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis, 4/16/2020.

V-Shape in Motion? China's Stop-Start-Stall

Bounce-back in activity is likely to unwind as world economy slows



Sources: Bloomberg, TS Lombard, 4/9/2020. * = Estimated using available data.

Agenda



1 Tracking the pace and control of the COVID-19 pandemic

2 Macro scenarios and indicators

3 Market response & implications


4 Assessing monetary, fiscal policy

Reviewing Equity Performance


Developed world lags, Latin America heavily hit; China perseveres



Developed Markets: Europe lags developed markets



Emerging Markets: LatAm depressed, China leads




Source: Bloomberg, 4/16/2020. DM = Developed Markets, EM = Emerging Markets. The legend items above are calculated using the following indices: DM = MSCI World Index; Europe = MSCI Europe Index; US = S&P 500 Index; Japan = MSCI Japan Index; Korea = MSCI Korea Index; EM = MSCI Emerging Markets Index; EM ex China = MSCI Emerging Markets ex China Index; China = MSCI China Index; Latin America = MSCI Latin America Index; EMEA EM = MSCI Emerging Markets Europe Index. All prices are quoted in terms of USD, benchmarked at 100 on 1/6/2020.

Major Shifts in Corporate Finance

US Dividend Cuts past historic peaks



US Companies, Number of Dividend Cuts






Political pressures on buybacks, dividends, bonuses may persist but macro, company fundamentals likely to dominate

Firms preserving cash. Debt vs. equity finance at firm, sector levels to matter.

Cashflow pressure to depend on intensity, duration of lockdowns and economic sector

Fed commercial paper facility to help US firms




US Market Indicators Indicate Perceived Safe-Haven Trades Underway



Source: Bloomberg, 4/15/2020.

Weak Links in the Eurozone


Demonstrating the Urgency of EZ Fiscal, Banking and Capital Markets Unions



Note: Equity Risk Premium – Earnings Yield less 10-year Bond Yield (EZ Government Bond Aggregate). The Earnings Yield is the reciprocal of the Price/Earnings Ratio.
Sources: Bloomberg, Macrobond, Invesco calculations, 4/10/2020.

US High Yield Credit Spreads Are a Key Indicator of Credit Stress


Credit Spreads Widening with COVID-19 Outbreak




Source: Bloomberg, 4/15/2020.

Oil and Oil Company Valuations near Extreme Lows

Joint COVID demand shock, supply glut are probably unsustainable



Monthly data since January 1870. As of 20 March 2020. WTI is West Texas Intermediate. Past performance is no guarantee of future results.
Source: Global Financial Data, Refinitiv Datastream, Invesco




Note: Monthly data from January 1973 to March 2020 (as of 20 March 2020). Oil & gas relative is the Datastream World Integrated Oil & Gas Index divide by the Datastream World Index. Real Brent is the USD price per barrel of Brent of oil divided by the US CPI index. Past performance is no guarantee of future results. .
Source: Refinitiv Datastream and Invesco

COVID-19, Oil Price Shocks Send Inflation Signals Reeling


OPEC supply glut crowds markets amid weakening demand



Market Inflation Expectations Fall on Oil Price Shock





Oil Prices (WTI)



Source: Bloomberg, 4/15/2020.

Oil Market Revival: Potential OPEC+ Production Cuts

While demand shortfall likely to persist, supply-side outlook improves




MM bbl/day is the unit of measurement for oil production.
Sources: OPEC Monthly Oil Market Report, Bloomberg, Invesco calculations.

All Global Safe-Asset Yields Well Below Long-Run Averages

Western and EM risk-/growth-gearred assets above average



Asset Class Yields within their Historical Ranges, %



- Asset class differences point to high premium on safety, liquidity – in a reversal of recent reach for yield across assets
- However, geographic differences suggest COVID-19 success can pay-off:
 - Most Japan growth-gearred and risk asset yields are below long term averages
 - Japan real estate yields, however, are above their long-run average

Notes: As of 26 March 2020. Past performance is no guarantee of future results. See appendices for definitions, methodology and disclaimers. Sources: Bloomberg Barclays, BofAML, FTSE, JP Morgan, Refinitiv Datastream, Invesco.

Agenda



1 Tracking the pace and control of the COVID-19 pandemic

2 Macro scenarios and indicators

3 Market response & implications


4 Assessing monetary, fiscal policy

Fiscal Policy: Room for Maneuver Varies Widely

Major EM countries bear monitoring – especially those with large COVID-19 risks



Budget Balance and Gross government debt – 2019 (% GDP)*




Source: IMF Fiscal Monitor October 2019, Invesco. *Blue blob = Developed Markets, Red blob = Emerging Markets.

Fiscal Policy: Stimulus... in Size


Mounting government actions in the developed world, while EM lags



Fiscal Support, Major Developed Economies, % of GDP



Fiscal Support, Select EM Economies, % of GDP




“Fiscal Impulse” refers to direct fiscal spending. “Deferrals” refer to temporary delays in tax filings and payments, and other fees to governments. “Guarantees” refer to loan guarantees and related vehicles. Indirect refers to measures that do not involve direct fiscal revenue or spending, including guarantees, deferrals and other measures.

Sources: Invesco calculations, Breugel Datasets (left-side chart), International Monetary Fund (right-side), as of 30 March 2020.

US Fiscal Response

Broad array of fiscal support to individuals, businesses



Fiscal Phases in the COVID-19 Response

- Phase 1: \$7.8B targeting vaccines, R&D

- Phase 2: \$100-\$125B targeting sick leave, unemployment insurance

- Phase 3: \$2.2T via direct checks, credit lines for small businesses and targeted highly impacted industries**

Tax filing deadline extended to July 15, 2020

- Phase 4: Expected ?

May target health care and pension protections, SNAP benefits, additional funding for state and local governments, free coronavirus testing and follow-up treatment, and potentially infrastructure

* Estimated.

Source: Invesco, 3/31/2020.

US Monetary Policy Response

Large-scale asset purchases, zero rates, & huge liquidity provisions



Rates

- FOMC cut rates to 0, through 50 bps and 100 bps cuts
- Discount window credit rate cut by 150 bps to 0.25%, 90-day term, repayable and renewable daily

Reserves & Regulatory

- Reserve requirement ratios reduced to 0%
- Discount window credit rate cut by 150 bps to 0.25%, 90-day term, repayable and renewable daily
- Fed's reserve management purchases extended beyond Treasury bills to full spectrum of Treasury securities

Asset Purchases

- Unlimited Quantitative Easing (QE), including commercial mortgage-backed securities (CMBS)

Liquidity

- Overnight repurchase agreements (repos) up to \$175B each, 2-week repos to \$45B each, weekly 1-month repos introduced at \$50B each, 3-month repos at \$500B each
- Dollar liquidity swaps daily, with major & EM central banks
- Targeted liquidity facilities



February 28
Powell: "We will
use our tools and act
as appropriate to
support the economy."

“Alphabet soup” of Facilities to Support Markets & Economy

Deep and broad-based support for bond, money market activities



Financial Crisis-Era Facilities

Commercial Paper Funding Facility (CPFF)

Reactivated March 17 until March 17, 2021

- Purchases commercial paper from American issuers with the highest credit ratings

Primary Dealer Credit Facility (PDCF)

Reactivated March 17 for at least 6 months

- Provides guaranteed loans to primary dealers at the discount rate with 90-day term, prepay any time
- Expanded acceptable collateral to include investment grade securities
 - BBB- and above: corporate debt, international agency, commercial paper, municipals)
 - AAA only: CMBS, CLOs, and CDOs
 - Equities

Money Market Mutual Fund Liquidity Facility (MMLF)

Reactivated March 18 until September 30, 2020

- Provides secured lending to banks for typical money market collateral

Term Asset-Backed Securities Loan Facility (TALF)

Reactivated March 23 until September 30, 2020

- Facilitates the issuance of ABS backed by newly originated consumer and small business loans
- ABS must...
 - have an AAA credit rating, must be issued on or after 23 March 2020
 - have an underlying credit exposure to auto loans, student loans, credit card receivables, small business loans guaranteed by the Small Business Administration
- Also includes AAA CLOs and AAA CMB

Primary Market Corporate Credit Facility (PMCCF)

Activated March 23 until September 20, 2020

- \$50B in capital, \$500B in capacity
- Purchase bonds from and provide loans to BBB-/Baa3 or higher issuers, rated as of March 22
- Maturities must not exceed 4 years
- Issuers must be US businesses, cannot be banks, and cannot be recipients of other specific support under the CARES Act

Secondary Market Corporate Credit Facility (SMCCF)

Activated March 23 until September 20, 2020

- \$25B in capital, \$250B in capacity
- Purchase bonds in the secondary market from eligible American issuers at fair market value
- Purchase bond portfolios via ETFs
- Minimum rating of BBB-/Baa3
- Remaining maturity of securities purchased by the SPV must not exceed 5 years

Sources: Federal Reserve Board, Invesco, 4/9/2020.

US Fed Takes Control of the Bond Market

The latest round provides up to \$2.3T in loans, roughly 11% of GDP

Small businesses, municipals see deep support



Main Street Lending Program

Activated April 9 *until September 20, 2020*

- \$75B in capital, up to \$600B in capacity
- Loans cannot be used to repay or refinance existing debt, with the exception of mandatory principal payments
- **New Loan Facility (MSNLF)**
 - 4-year loans to businesses with up to 10K employees or \$2.5B in revenues
 - Limited to the lesser of \$25M or 4x 2019 EBITDA
 - Priced at SOFR + 250-400bps, with an additional 100bps origination fee with payments deferred for one year
 - Made through commercial banks
- **Expanded Loan Facility (MSELF)**
 - Terms same as MSNLF
 - Loans are limited to the lesser of \$150mn, 30% of the borrower's undrawn bank debt, or 6x EBITDA

Municipal Liquidity Facility

Activated April 9 *until September 20, 2020*

- \$35B in capital, \$500B capacity
- The facility will purchase short-term notes directly from issuers
- Price based on an issuer's credit rating
- Total purchases from any one issuer limited to 20% of an issuer's own-source revenues (as of FY2017)
- Primary aim of this facility is likely to be to help states accommodate near-term revenue declines due to a drop in economic activity as well as the delayed tax filing deadline.
- This program does not plug state government budget gaps – Congressional action needed

Paycheck Protection Program Liquidity Facility (PPPLF)

Activated April 9 *until March 17, 2021*

- \$0B in capital, unlimited capacity
- Provide term financing to banks originating Paycheck Protection Program (PPP) loans
- Should incrementally help banks with funding these loans
- Loans are 100% guaranteed by the Small Business Administration (SBA)

Other Policy Responses Mounting

A review of recent monetary policy action



March 9
Kuroda: “BoJ will take appropriate action without hesitation.”




March 12
LaGarde: “[We need] an ambitious and coordinated fiscal policy response.”



	Policy rates	Asset purchases	Liquidity	Bank regulation
ECB	No change	EUR 870B new EUR 1.1T by year end	Additional LTRO funds until TLTRO III in June At lower rates	Banks can use capital and liquidity buffers Broader interpretation of CET1 assets (AT1, say) Delaying inspection processes
BOE	Cut 65 bps to 10 bps	£200B	Term funding for SMEs (could be up to £100bn)	Countercyclical capital buffer reduced to 0% from 1% Total £290B package is around 13% of GDP Stress tests canceled for 2020
PBOC	Some rates cut 10 bps		\$70B injected via open market operations	RRRs cut by 100-150 bps (adding \$180B of loan potential) SME financing encouraged; interest/repayments delayed
BOJ	No change	\$52B additional ETF purchases \$10B extra corporate bonds	Will tap Fed’s dollar liquidity swaps	


Which direction is the global economy trending?

How will policymakers react to existing conditions?



Economic and Asset Return Scenarios

Projected 12m global asset class returns by global GDP scenario



- **Very Best case**

- S&P 500 = 3000
- Eurostoxx 50 = 2900
- Gold = \$1375
- Brent = \$45

- **Very worst case**

- S&P 500 = 1400
- Eurostoxx 50 = 1350
- Gold = \$1750
- Brent = \$20

Notes: based on local currency returns. Figures in parenthesis are our subjective probabilities. GDP data shows projected global GDP growth in 2020. See Appendix 2 for more detail. Cash is an equally weighted mix of USD, EUR, GBP and JPY. As of 16 March 2020. There is no guarantee these views will come to pass. See Appendices for definitions, methodology and disclaimers. Source: BAML, MSCI, GSCI, FTSE, Refinitiv Datastream and Invesco.

Invesco's Global Market Strategy Office Membership



Global Market Strategy Office

Kristina Hooper

Chief Global Market Strategist
Kristina.Hooper@invesco.com
New York, Americas

Ashley Oerth

Investment Strategy Analyst
Ashley.Oerth@invesco.com
New York, Americas

Brian Levitt

Global Market Strategist – NA
Brian.Levitt@invesco.com
New York, Americas

Timothy Horsburgh, CFA

Investment Strategist
Timothy.Horsburgh@invesco.com
New York, Americas

Talley Léger

Investment Strategist, Equities
Talley.Leger@invesco.com
New York, Americas

Arnab Das

Global Market Strategist, EMEA
Arnab.Das@invesco.com
London, EMEA

Paul Jackson

Global Head of Asset Allocation Research
Paul.Jackson@invesco.com
London, EMEA

András Vig

Multi-Asset Strategist
Andras.Vig@invesco.com
London, EMEA

Tomo Kinoshita

Global Market Strategist, Japan
Tomo.Kinoshita@invesco.com
Tokyo, Asia-Pacific

David Chao

Global Market Strategist, APAC
David.Chao@invesco.com
Hong Kong, Asia-Pacific

Luca Tobagi, CFA*

Prod Director/Investment Strategist
Luca.Tobagi@invesco.com
Milan, EMEA

* Affiliated member. EMEA indicates the Europe, Middle East, and Africa regions. AP indicates the Asia-Pacific region.

Appendix 1:

Asset allocation methodology, definitions and sources



Asset class descriptions and sources (we source data from Datastream unless otherwise stated)

Cash: returns are based on a proprietary index calculated using the Intercontinental Exchange Benchmark Administration overnight LIBOR (London Interbank Offer Rate). The global rate is the average of the euro, British pound, US dollar and Japanese yen rates. The series started on 1st January 2001 with a value of 100. The same data is used to construct historical comparisons (yields within historical ranges, say).

Gold: London bullion market spot price in USD/troy ounce.

Government bonds: Current values in the market forecast table (slides 26 and 36) use Datastream benchmark 10-year yields for the US, Eurozone, Japan and the UK and the Thomson Reuters China benchmark 10-year yield for China. Historical and projected yields and returns (slides 26 and 36) are based on Bank of America Merrill Lynch government bond indices with historical ranges starting on 31st December 1985 for the Global, Europe ex-UK, UK and Japanese indices and 30th January 1978 for the US. The emerging markets yields and returns are based on the Barclays Bloomberg emerging markets sovereign US dollar bond index with the historical range starting on 28th February 2003. The same indices are used to construct historical comparisons (yields within historical ranges, say).

Corporate investment grade (IG) bonds: Bank of America Merrill Lynch investment grade corporate bond indices with historical ranges starting on 31st December 1996 for the Global, 31st January 1973 for the US dollar, 1st January 1996 for the euro, 31st December 1996 for the British pound, and 6th September 2001 for the Japanese yen indices. The emerging markets yields and returns are based on the Barclays Bloomberg emerging markets corporate US dollar bond index with the historical range starting on 28th February 2003.

Corporate high-yield (HY) bonds: Bank of America Merrill Lynch High-Yield indices with historical ranges starting on 29th August 1986 for the US dollar, and 31st December 1997 for the Global and euro indices. The same indices are used to construct historical comparisons (yields within historical ranges, say).

Equities: We use MSCI benchmark indices to calculate projected returns and calculate long-term total returns with historical ranges starting on 31st December 1969 for the Global, US, Europe ex-UK, UK and Japanese indices, and 31st December 1987 for the emerging markets index. Equity index valuations (such as yields within historical ranges) are based on dividend yields using Datastream benchmark indices with historical ranges starting on 1st January 1973 for the Global, US, Europe ex-UK and Japanese indices, on 31st December 1969 for the UK index and 2nd January 1995 for the Emerging Markets index. The same indices are used to construct historical comparisons (yields within historical ranges, say).

Real estate: We use FTSE EPRA/NAREIT indices with historical ranges starting on 29th December 1989 for the US, Europe ex-UK, UK and Japanese indices, 18th February 2005 for the Global index, and 31st October 2008 for the Emerging Markets index. The same indices are used to construct historical comparisons (yields within historical ranges, say).

Commodities: Standard and Poor's Goldman Sachs Commodity Total Return Indices with historical ranges starting on 31st December 1969 for the All Commodities and Agriculture indices, 31st December 1982 for the Energy index, 3rd January 1977 for the Industrial Metals index, and 2nd January 1973 for the Precious Metals index. We refer to oil & gas and industrial metals as industrial commodities.

Appendix 2:

Coronavirus scenarios and Shiller Price-Earnings Ratios



We consider four scenarios along with our subjective probabilities:

- **Very best case (5% probability):** 2.0% global GDP growth in 2020 (versus our previous estimate of 3.0%). This assumes the global outbreak is contained as rapidly as in China and, with the onset of the Northern Hemisphere spring and summer, the outbreak is well under control by mid-year. We believe this would imply a short, sharp shock to the global economy, with quick recovery and little effect on growth over the next year or so. This implies a slight worsening of our 12-month asset class assumptions about policy rates, yield curves, credit spreads, default rates, commodity prices and equity/real estate yields/growth.
- **Best case (45% probability):** 1.0% global GDP growth in 2020. This assumes a deeper Q2 slump in global GDP. Also, we allow for the potentially disruptive financial effect of the sharp fall in the price of oil. Policy makers (central banks and governments) are assumed to offset some of the short-term economic consequences, providing lifelines to distressed corporates and households. Though there is a GDP growth deficit in 2020, we assume that 2021 growth will be boosted beyond the 3.0% we had originally expected. Effectively, this causes displacement of some economic activity and profits from 2020 into 2021. Though this causes us to downgrade our 12-month assumptions, we suppose the worst of the impact on market risk-premia will be over within the 12-month forecast period.
- **Worst case (45% probability):** -1.0% global GDP growth in 2020. Covid-19 develops into a serious pandemic that is not halted by warming temperatures and that proves difficult to control, with vaccines and cures not available until 2021. This could involve widespread loss of life and the closure of much economic activity for a prolonged period, provoking global recession. Recovery of lost output does not occur until the end of 2020 and into 2021.
- **Very worst case (5% probability):** this assumes a dramatic escalation of Covid-19 to Spanish flu proportions. The World Bank estimated in 2014 that such an outbreak could

reduce global GDP by 5% and we assume a 2020 growth rate of -3.5% (versus the original +3%). The downturn could be exacerbated by high debt ratios and the impotence of many central banks. Our asset class assumptions for this scenario assume a return to GFC conditions.

US Shiller PE: the Shiller PE is a price to earnings ratio constructed by dividing price by the average earnings per share in the previous 10 years (with both numerator and denominator adjusted for inflation). It is what is commonly known as a cyclically-adjusted PE ratio. It is constructed by US academic Robert Shiller. Data is monthly from 1881 (source Robert Shiller – see [here](#)).

US stock/equity index: we have calculated a total return index for broad US stocks based on index and dividend data from US academic Robert Shiller and Datastream. The index prior to 1926 is Robert Shiller's recalculation of data from Common Stock Indexes by Cowles & Associates (see [here](#)). From 1926 to 1957, the Shiller data is based on the S&P Composite Index and thereafter is based on the S&P 500 as we know it today.

Important Information



The value of investments and any income will fluctuate (this may partly be the result of exchange rate fluctuations) and investors may not get back the full amount invested.

Important Information (continued)



This document is intended only for Professional Clients in Continental Europe (as defined below), Dubai, Jersey, Guernsey, the Isle of Man, Ireland and the UK; in Hong Kong for Professional Investors, in Japan for Qualified Institutional Investors; in Switzerland for Qualified Investors; in New Zealand for wholesale investors (as defined in the Financial Markets Conduct Act), and in Australia, and the USA for Institutional Investors. In Canada, the document is intended only for accredited investors as defined under National Instrument 45-106. It is not intended for and should not be distributed to, or relied upon, by the public.

For the distribution of this document, Continental Europe is defined as Austria, Belgium, Czech Republic, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Norway, Spain, Sweden.

This document is marketing material and is not intended as a recommendation to invest in any particular asset class, security or strategy. Regulatory requirements that require impartiality of investment/investment strategy recommendations are therefore not applicable nor are any prohibitions to trade before publication. The information provided is for illustrative purposes only, it should not be relied upon as recommendations to buy or sell securities. The opinions expressed are those of the author, are based upon current market conditions, may differ from those of other investment professionals, are subject to change without notice and are not to be construed as investment advice.

This document contains general information only and does not take into account individual objectives, taxation position or financial needs. This should not be considered a recommendation to purchase any investment product. This does not constitute a recommendation of any investment strategy for a particular investor. Investors should consult a financial professional before making any investment decisions if they are uncertain whether an investment is suitable for them. Please obtain and review all financial material carefully before investing. By accepting this document, you consent to communicate with us in English, unless you inform us otherwise. Neither Invesco Ltd. nor any of its member companies guarantee the return of capital, distribution of income or the performance of any fund or strategy.

This document is not an invitation to subscribe for shares in a fund nor is it to be construed as an offer to buy or sell any financial instruments. As with all investments, there are associated inherent risks. This document is by way of information only.

Asset management services are provided by Invesco in accordance with appropriate local legislation and regulations.

By accepting this document, you consent to communicate with us in English, unless you inform us otherwise.

Important Information (continued)



Information for specific jurisdictions:

This information is distributed by Invesco Asset Management Limited DIFC Branch which is regulated by the Dubai Financial Services Authority (“DFSA”) and is only directed at Professional Clients and no other person should rely upon the information contained within it. The DFSA has not approved this information and any associated materials have been provided to you at your express request, and for your exclusive use. If you do not understand the contents of this document you should consult an authorised financial adviser.

This document is only being marketed in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia in accordance with Article 20 (Exclusions) of the Securities Business Regulations issued on 28 June 2005 (the “Regulations”). Article 20(4) of the Regulations states that, a securities offering is excluded from the prohibition in Article 17 (Securities Advertisements) of the Regulations if it is directed only at authorised persons, exempt persons or institutions. The Interests are only being marketed to exempt persons (as specified in Annex 1 to the Regulations) and institutions which own, or which are a member of a group which owns, net assets of not less than 10 million Saudi Riyals.

The document has not been approved by the Central Bank of Bahrain which takes no responsibility for its contents. This [document] is intended to be read by the addressee only and must not be passed to, issued to, or shown to the public

generally.

The information contained in this document neither constitutes a public offer of securities in the Sultanate of Oman as contemplated by the Commercial Companies Law of Oman (Royal Decree 4/74) or the Capital Market Law of Oman (Royal Decree 80/98), nor does it constitute an offer to sell, or the solicitation of any offer to buy Non-Omani securities in the Sultanate of Oman as contemplated by Article 139 of the Executive Regulations to the Capital Market Law (issued by Decision No.1/2009). Additionally, this private placement memorandum is not intended to lead to the conclusion of any contract of whatsoever nature within the territory of the Sultanate of Oman.

Important Information (continued)



This document, and the information contained herein, does not constitute, and is not intended to constitute, a public offer of securities in the United Arab Emirates and accordingly should not be construed as such.

The Authorities assume no liability for any investment that the named addressee makes as a non-natural Qualified Investor. The document is for the use of the named addressee only and should not be given or shown to any other person (other than employees, agents or consultants in connection with the addressee's consideration thereof).

This document is not for general circulation to the public in Kuwait.

Important Information (continued)



This article is issued:

- in Australia and New Zealand by Invesco Australia Limited (ABN 48 001 693 232), Level 26, 333 Collins Street, Melbourne, Victoria, 3000, which holds an Australian Financial Services Licence number 239916.
- in Canada by Invesco Canada Ltd., 5140 Yonge Street, Suite 800, Toronto, Ontario, M2N 6X7.
- in Denmark, Finland, France, Greece, Luxembourg and Norway by Invesco Asset Management SA, 16-18 rue de Londres, 75009 Paris, France.
- Issued by Invesco Asset Management Limited, P.O. Box 506599, DIFC Precinct Building No 4, Level 3, Office 305, Dubai, United Arab Emirates. Regulated by the Dubai Financial Services Authority.
- in Germany by Invesco Asset Management GmbH, An der Welle 5, 60322 Frankfurt am Main, Germany.
- in Hong Kong by Invesco Hong Kong Limited 景順投資管理有限公司, 41/F, Champion Tower, Three Garden Road, Central, Hong Kong. This document has not been reviewed by the Securities and Futures Commission.
- in Japan by Invesco Asset Management (Japan) Limited, Roppongi Hills Mori Tower 14F, 6-10-1 Roppongi, Minato-ku, Tokyo 106-6114; Registration Number: The Director-General of Kanto Local Finance Bureau (*Kin-sho*) 306; Member of the Investment Trusts Association, Japan and the Japan Investment Advisers Association.
- in Switzerland by Invesco Asset Management (Schweiz) AG, Talacker 34, 8001 Zürich, Switzerland.

- in the UK, Ireland, Jersey, Guernsey and the Isle of Man by Invesco Asset Management Limited, Perpetual Park, Perpetual Park Drive, Henley-on-Thames, Oxfordshire, RG9 1HH, United Kingdom. Authorised and regulated by the Financial Conduct Authority.
- in the US by Invesco Advisers, Inc., Two Peachtree Pointe, 1555 Peachtree Street, N.E., Suite 1800, Atlanta, GA 30309.

II-MMFCV-PPT-1 4/20